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Abstract 
A cross-cultural comparison between U.S. and Hong Kong preschoolers examined factors 
responsible for young children's analogical reasoning errors.  On a scene analogy task, both 
groups had adequate prerequisite knowledge of the key relations, were the same age, and showed 
similar baseline performance, yet Chinese children outperformed U.S. children on more 
relationally complex problems.  Children from both groups were highly susceptible to choosing a 
perceptual or semantic distractor during reasoning when one was present. Taken together, these 
similarities and differences suggest that 1) cultural differences can facilitate better knowledge 
representations allowing for more efficient processing of relationally complex problems, and 2) 
that inhibitory control is an important factor in explaining the development of children’s 
analogical reasoning.
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Young Children's Analogical Reasoning across Cultures: Similarities and Differences 
 
 Analogical reasoning is a powerful mechanism in children's cognitive development. In an 
analogy, successful reasoners construct correspondences between two systems of relations to 
solve a problem (Gentner, 1983). For example, knowledge of using a stool to reach a toy can be 
used to figure out that a ladder could help reach a cookie jar. This skill enables children to draw 
on prior knowledge representations to make sense of new contexts and to build expertise by 
comparing and contrasting representations (see Goswami, 1992). Infants show analogical 
thinking and problem solving by a year and a half (Chen, Sanchez & Campbell, 1997); however, 
they do not approximate adults' levels of competence until adolescence (Halford, 1993; 
Richland, Morrison & Holyoak, 2006). Errors in young children's analogical reasoning are 
characterized by difficulty ignoring irrelevant object properties, like the difference in appearance 
between a ladder and a stool (e.g., Rattermann & Gentner, 1991; Richland et al, 2006).  Also, 
young children have been shown to struggle with reasoning about multiple relationships at once 
(e.g., Halford, 1993; Richland et al, 2006).  
 Several explanations have been posed to explain the development of analogy in children. 
The relational primacy theory holds that adequate knowledge about key relations is the main 
prerequisite for analogical reasoning (e.g., understanding "reaching" to solve the above example) 
(Goswami, 1992). Gentner and Rattermann (1991) argue, in addition, that until children have the 
adequate knowledge, they will not only fail to reason analogically, they will focus their answers 
on object properties and appearance (Relational Shift Hypothesis). This relational shift is not tied 
to the age of a child, but rather to knowledge, so that even an adult who is not knowledgeable 
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about an analogy task may tend to make mappings based on object properties, while s/he will 
shift to more relational mappings once adequate knowledge is acquired.  
 Two aspects of executive resources have also been suggested as important for the 
development of analogical reasoning. Halford (1993) has suggested that the inability to process 
multiple relations in analogies may be due to limits in children’s working memory. Halford and 
colleagues found that children's developmental differences across a variety of tasks could be 
calculated as a function of the relational complexity, or the number of relationships that must be 
held in working memory simultaneously. Based on this model, children should be able to reliably 
solve tasks with a single level of relational complexity before approximately five years, after 
which two relations should be attainable.  
Likewise, we have previously posited that limits on inhibitory control may explain why 
young children solving analogy tasks sometimes still map correspondences based on object 
properties and general appearance correspondences in spite of understanding the relations and 
the analogy task (Richland, et al., 2006). 
 The current paper used a cross-cultural approach to explore interactions among these 
factors and to investigate their explanatory power in a broader sample. Much of the prior 
research has been conducted with U.S. and Australian children, but adult and developmental 
research suggest that cultural experiences may impact the development of analogical reasoning. 
Relational Reasoning Across Cultures 
 Cultural experiences may influence relational reasoning in several ways.  Knowledge of 
cultural content may impact prerequisite knowledge of relations, and consequently, influence 
analogical reasoning on problem-solving tasks that rely on that cultural knowledge (Chen, Mo, & 
Honomichl, 2004).  
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 In addition, culture may be related to normative patterns of relational reasoning and 
analogy production (Richland, Zur & Holyoak, 2007). Normative patterns for drawing relational 
inferences during problem solving can vary across cultures when content knowledge is 
comparable (see D'Andrade, Nisbett 2003). Chinese and Japanese reasoners may attend 
relatively more to relational patterns in visual representations and problems, while U.S. reasoners 
may attend relatively preferentially to object-based information (see Hansen, 1983; Nisbett, 
2003).  Such cultural variations have been demonstrated in visual scene interpretations, which 
are often used in analogical reasoning tasks. In one cross-cultural study, Chinese outperformed 
U.S. undergraduates in assessing covariation in presentations of arbitrary objects (e.g., judging 
whether schematic drawings of a coin and a lightbulb had been shown on the screen together).  
The Chinese students also showed greater attention to relations between the figures and 
background than U.S. participants, who demonstrated more attention to focal objects, or figure 
independence (Ji, Peng & Nisbett, 2000).  
 Analyses of children's everyday experiences suggest these reasoning and attention 
patterns are part of children's socialized experience with relational inputs in schools (Richland, 
Zur & Holyoak, 2007) and at home with caregivers. Asian caregivers seem particularly 
interested in directing infants’ attention to how entities—human and otherwise—interact and 
relate to one another, including using action oriented language and referential verbs (e.g., 
swimming, ate, going to drive) (e.g., Korean: Au, Dapretto, & Song, 1994; Gopnik, Choi & 
Baumberger, 1996; Japanese: Fernald & Morikawa, 1993; Ogura, Dale, Yamashita, Murase, 
2006; Chinese: (Mandarin) Tardif, et.al, 1997; Tardif, et.al, 1999; (Cantonese) Leung, 1998). 
The play of English speaking caretakers, who served as a comparison group in many of these 
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studies, is relatively object focused, including using more naming and non-referential verbs (e.g., 
'looks like,' 'lookit, 'watch') (e.g., Goldfield, 1993; Gopnik, et al, 1996).  
 The current paper uses a scene analogy task (Richland, et al., 2006) to explore the 
hypothesis that Chinese preschool children approach analogies differently than U.S. children 
based on their relatively greater experiences with relations. We specifically hypothesized that 
Chinese children might be able to processes analogies more efficiently by constructing higher-
level relational representations, thus making better use of comparable working-memory 
resources.  The task used simple, common relations and a counterbalancing design that held 
necessary content knowledge constant across conditions, so any differences in performance 
should not be attributable to variations in prerequisite knowledge.  
 We also sought to test our hypothesis (Richland, et al., 2006) that maturational limitations 
in inhibitory control explain children's low performance on analogies that include a strong 
object-similarity distractor. We predicted a common pattern across countries showing relatively 
lower performance on analogies with a distractor versus no-distractor despite comparable 
prerequisite knowledge.  The relational shift hypothesis (Rattermann & Gentner, 1991), by 
contrast, would predict that children’s susceptibility to distraction would decrease as their 
relational knowledge increases.  Thus Chinese children should be less susceptible to distraction 
than U.S. children.  
 Three and four-year-old Chinese children's task performance was compared to two 
samples of U.S. children of the same ages:  Sample-1) previously published data with 
instructions that were semantically matched to the Cantonese version and used typical 
grammatical forms in each language (Richland et al, 2006, Experiment 2), and Sample-2) new 
data from a more syntactically similar back-translation of the Cantonese task instructions. We 
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tested cross-cultural variations in ability to handle relational complexity (1-versus vs. 2-




 Children were sampled from middle to upper income preschools in several locations in 
the United States and one location in Hong Kong.  All children were native speakers in their 
country of origin. Although demographic data were not collected systematically, participating 
children in Hong Kong were primarily of Chinese descent, and U.S. children were of diverse 
ethnic backgrounds, including Caucasian, Asian, Asian American, and Latin American descent. 
Children were excluded from data analyses for failure to grasp the task as denoted by scoring 
under two standard deviations from the mean percent correct and correctly answering one or 
fewer of the simplest problems (1-Relation, No-Distractor).  
 Hong Kong. Sixty-one preschoolers participated (19 3-year-olds, 41 4-year-olds). Their 
mean age was 48 months (SD=5.4 mos).  One additional 3-year-old was excluded for failing to 
grasp the task.  
 U.S. Sample-1. (Richland et al, 2006 Experiment 2). Twenty preschoolers participated (7 
3-year olds and 13 4-year olds).  Their mean age was 51 months (SD = 9). Three additional 3 
year-olds were excluded for failing to grasp the task.  
 U.S. Sample-2. Thirty-eight preschoolers participated (13 3-year olds and 25 4-years-
olds). Their mean age was 46 months (SD = 5 mos).  Two additional 3-year-olds and three 4-
year-olds were excluded for failure to grasp the task.  
Materials  
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 In the scene analogy task (Richland et al., 2006), children saw 20 pairs of scenes with one 
pair per page (see Figure 1 for examples of one stimuli). The pictures showed the same relation 
but differed in the objects. For example, in the simplest version of the Figure 1 scene pair, the 
top picture showed a boy reaching for a cookie.  The bottom picture showed a dog reaching for a 
bone.  In the top picture, an arrow pointed to one of the objects (e.g, the boy, who is the 
"reacher"). The child was asked to point to the corresponding object in the bottom picture (e.g., 
the dog, who is the "reacher").   
 Scene analogy pairs varied in a factorial design along two dimensions.  First, the level of 
relational complexity was manipulated by moving objects within the scenes to vary the number 
of instances of the same relation present within the pictures (e.g., 1-Relation: "boy reaches for 
cookie"; 2-Relations: "mom reaches for boy who reaches for cookie"). All four versions of each 
picture set always contained exactly the same number of objects within the picture (either five or 
six) and all key objects were always present, though in different roles. 
 Second, the scenes varied in the presence or absence of an object-similarity distractor in 
the target picture.  The distractor was an object in the target scene that was perceptually and 
semantically similar to the object with the arrow in the source picture, (e.g., a stationary boy in 
the target picture beside the reaching dog and man).  This forced participants to make a choice 
between a relational and an object-similarity match.  
 Manipulating relational complexity (1-vs. 2-Relations) and distraction (Distractor vs. No-
Distractor) led to four version of each scene pair.  There were twenty total picture scene pairs, so 
packets were constructed such that each packet contained five of each version of the scene pairs 
(1-Relation/No-Distractor; 1-Relation/Distractor, 2-Relation/No-Distractor, 2-
Relation/Distractor).  Participants saw each scene pair once.  
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 The packets used in Hong Kong and the U.S. were identical with one small difference 
between the U.S. Sample-1 and both the Hong Kong and U.S. Sample-2 versions.  In the Hong 
Kong and U.S. Sample-2 stimuli, to ensure children’s task understanding during administration, 
two of the simplest items (1-Relation/No-Distractor) were always administered first, followed by 
the remaining 18 items in random order. In the original U.S. studies (Sample-1 here), all twenty 
items were randomized.  With the same goal to ensure task understanding, there was also a 
translational difference in the U.S. Sample-1 versus the Hong Kong and U.S. Sample-2 
procedures (described below). 
Procedure 
 The procedure was the same for children tested in Cantonese and English. A trained 
experimenter tested participants individually beginning with two practice problems, emphasizing 
that the task was to select the object in the bottom picture that was in the same part of the pattern 
as the object with the arrow in the top picture. After the child’s response to the first practice item, 
the experimenter gave feedback and a second opportunity to answer. If the child’s response was 
still incorrect, the solution was provided and the cycle repeated for the second practice item.  
 For each scene pair, the experimenter would verbalize the key relations in the top picture.  
In the example above, the instruction was: "Look, here is a boy reaching for a cookie.  What is 
like the boy in the bottom picture?" The child would then point to an object in the bottom 
picture, which was marked by the researcher.i   
 The 2-Relation problems led to a translational challenge.  In the original Richland et al, 
(2006) experiments (U.S. Sample-1 in the current study) the experimenter described the source 
problem as a series of chained relations: "Look, here is a mom reaching for a boy who is 
reaching for a cookie." Because there is no Cantonese equivalent to this construction or the 
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relative pronoun "who," the translation for the Hong Kong sample read like two serial phrases: 
“look, here is a mom reaching for a boy; boy reaching for a cookie."  This change should not 
have altered the relational complexity of the problems because the relations cannot be collapsed 
in either case (i.e., "mom reaching for a cookie"). 
 Even so, to ensure the phrasing did not make the problem simpler, U.S. Sample-2 was 
tested on the English back-translation of the 2-Relation problems.  The relations were described 
using two serial phrases as translated above.  
Results 
 Data from the Hong Kong sample and U.S. Sample-2 were first compared to chance to 
ensure children understood the task as translated into Chinese and back-translated into English. 
Next, an omnibus ANOVA compared the Hong Kong children's performance to U.S. Samples-1 
and 2 to investigate cross-cultural differences or commonalities in reaction to the relational 
complexity and distraction manipulations.  Planned comparisons examined the reliability of the 
cross-cultural variations across the two U.S. samples.  
Comparisons with Chance 
Chance was calculated as the likelihood of selecting the target object out of all objects in 
the target picture, a total of 5.3 across all picture sets, or 19% chance.  All means are available in 
Table 1. Children of ages 3 and 4 in each culture were above chance on all four conditions using 
t-tests with a Bonferroni corrected alpha at the targeted .05 level (.003), all p's < .001. Results 
indicated that the children in both groups understood the task, showed adequate prerequisite 
knowledge, and could reason relationally.   
Cross-cultural comparison  
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 A repeated-measures ANOVA compared the Hong Kong and U.S. children's performance.  
The omnibus ANOVA included relational complexity (1- vs. 2-Relations) and distractor 
(Distractor vs. No-Distractor) as within-subject factors, and group (Hong Kong vs. U.S. Sample-
1 vs. U.S. Sample-2) and age (3 vs. 4 years) as between-subject factors. Means are reported in 
Table 1. 
 There was a main effect of age, F(1, 112) = 9.79, p < .01, hp2 = .08.  Four-year-olds 
outperformed three-year-olds overall (M = 42.8, SE = 2.39; M = 52.0; SE = 1.72), but age did not 
interact with any other variable (all F’s (1 or 2,112) < .92). There was no overall main effect of 
nationality, F(2, 112) = 2.7, p =.07. Interactions between nationality and the two other variables 
are described below.  
 There was a main effect of relational complexity, F(1, 112) = 10.2, p < .01, hp2 = .08 
which, as predicted, was modified by an interaction between nationality and relational 
complexity F(2, 112) = 3.2, p < .05, hp2 = .053.  Planned comparisons revealed the same 
interaction when the Hong Kong data were compared separately to each of the U.S. samples 
(F(1,78) = 6.6, p = .01, hp2 = .08; F(1, 94) = 5.5, p < .05, hp2 = .06).  As shown in Figure 1, on 
the 1-Relation problems there was no difference in performance between Hong Kong and either 
sample of the U.S. children (t(78) = .68, p = .5; t(96) = .69, p = .84). On the 2-Relation problems, 
by contrast, the Hong Kong children outperformed both samples of U.S. children (t(78) = 2.6, p 
= .01; t(96) = 3.16, p < .002). This suggests that the Chinese children were better able to handle 
relational complexity than U.S. children, and that they were using a strategy that allowed them to 
solve 2-Relation problems without overtaxing their working memory system.  
 There was an overall main effect of distractor, F(1, 112) = 35.8, p < .001, hp2 = .24, such 
that participants scored higher on No-Distractor problems than on Distractor problems (M = 
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58%, SE = 2.34; M = 40%, SE = 1.82).  There was no interaction between nationality and 
distractor, F(2, 112) = .60, p = .55.  As shown in Figure 1, planned comparisons showed that 
accuracy was lower on Distractor problems than No-Distractor problems for all samples, (U.S. 
sample 1: t(19) = 5.4, p < .0001, d = 1.4; U.S. sample 2: t(37) = 3.2, p < .003, d = .63; Hong 
Kong: t(59) = 5.0, p < .0001, d = .96). 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 In summary, there were no differences in the simplest problems between the U.S. and 
Chinese children on the scene analogy task, which ruled out concerns of baseline between-group 
differences in task comprehension or in prerequisite knowledge.  In contrast, there was a cross-
cultural difference with respect to relational complexity. As predicted, Chinese children were 
more skilled at processing complex relations than either group of U.S. children. Though it is 
possible that the Chinese children had greater working-memory capacity than U.S. children at 
the same age, the likelihood is low. Young and older adults in the U.S. and China do not show 
differences in working memory or speed of processing on visuospatial tasks that are unlikely to 
reflect cultural bias (Hedden et al., 2002). While several studies have shown differences in 
simple short-term memory (e.g., forward span) between English and Chinese speakers and 
children, (e.g., C. Chen & Stevenson, 1988; Z.-W. Chen, Cowell, Verley & Wang, 2009), these 
differences likely reflect differences in language phonology and are not found in measures 
believed to reflect working-memory capacity (e.g., backward span). Thus it is unlikely the type 
of working-memory processing required to map scene analogies would differ across our groups. 
The analogy pattern is more consistent with our initial hypothesis that Chinese children's greater 
experience with socialized relational inputs would provide them an advantage in complex 
analogies. 
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 While pinpointing an environmental explanation is beyond this paper's scope, the finding 
that Chinese children outperformed U.S. children of the same age on relationally complex 
analogies is informative to theories of analogy development. This pattern suggests that the ability 
to represent relations is a learnable skill, separable from - though dependent on - the related 
constructs of prerequisite content knowledge and working memory capacity. 
 The observed cross-cultural difference supports the view that prior experience is integral 
to analogical reasoning development, but extends previous descriptions of its role either as 
prerequisite domain knowledge (Goswami, 1992) or as a mechanism for undergoing the 
relational shift (Gentner & Rattermann, 1991).  With increased relational experience, children 
may learn greater efficiency in constructing relational representations.  In our task, that would 
mean the Chinese children processed the 2-Relation problems as single three-part relations, 
while the U.S. children processed them as two two-part relations. 
 Unlike relational complexity, there were no differences in susceptibility to the distractor 
object between Chinese and U.S. children. All groups of children were more accurate on No-
Distractor problems than on Distractor problems. This result runs counter to the relational shift 
hypothesis that children will tend to reason relationally, versus based on object similarity, with 
adequate prerequisite knowledge (Rattermann & Gentner, 1991). Rather, maturation of executive 
resources may better explain what appear to be age-related changes in object-similarity 
distractability. This explanation is compatible with developmental studies of executive resources 
(see Diamond, 2002) and declines in relational reasoning by patients with frontal lobe atrophy 
(see Morrison et al., 2004; Krawczyk et al, 2008).  The explanation also fits developmental 
trends in children's ability to make decisions about whether to attend to relational versus object 
similarity based on their determined utility for a given task (Bulloch & Opfer, 2009).  
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 Morrison, Doumas & Richland (2007) used LISA (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997) to 
simulate these results, providing a framework for how inhibitory control and experience could 
interact. Assuming that U.S. children represented the 2-Relation problems as two, two-part 
relations while Hong Kong children chunked these into a single, three-part relation revealed the 
cross-cultural interaction with relational complexity, while a simple change in inhibition in the 
model for all children captured the variation between the Distractor/No-Distractor conditions.  
 Overall, these cross-cultural results suggest that experience plays an under-explored role 
in relational representation, which can impact processing efficiency, but that maturation in 
executive resources is also critical for the development of analogical reasoning.  




Au, T. K-F., Dapretto, M., Song, Y-K. (1994). Input vs constraints: Early word acquisition in 
Korean and English. Journal of Memory and Language 33(5), 567-582. 
Bulloch, M. J. & Opfer, J. E. (2009). What makes relational reasoning smart? Revisiting the 
perceptual-to-relational shift in development of generalization. Developmental Science, 12, 
114 - 122. 
Chen, C., & Stevenson, H. W. (1988). Cross-linguistic differences in digit span of preschool 
children. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 46, 150–158. 
Chen, Z.-Y., Cowell, P. E., Varley, R.,Wang, Y.-C. (2009). A cross-language study of verbal 
 and visuospatial working memory span, Journal of Clinical and Experimental 
Neuropsychology, 31(4), 385-391. 
Chen, Z., Mo, L., & Honomichl, R. (2004). Having the memory of an elephant: Long-term 
retrieval and use of analogues in problem solving. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 133, 415-433. 
Chen, Z., Sanchez, R., & Campbell, T. (1997). From beyond to within their grasp: Analogical 
problem solving in 10- and 13-month-olds.  Developmental Psychology, 33, 790-801. 
D'Andrade, R. G. (1995). The development of cognitive anthropology. Cambridge  
 New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Diamond A. (2002). Normal development of prefrontal cortex from birth to young adulthood: 
Cognitive functions, anatomy, and biochemistry (pp. 466-503). In D.T. Stuss & R.T. Knight 
(Eds). Principles of frontal lobe function. London: Oxford University Press. 
Fernald, A., & Morikawa, H. (1993). Common themes and cultural variations in  
 Japanese and American mothers' speech to infants. Child Development, 64(3), 637-656.  
Analogical Reasoning across Cultures      16 
Gentner, D.  (1983).  Structure-mapping: A theoretical framework for analogy.  Cognitive 
Science, 7, 155-170. 
Gentner, D. , & Rattermann, M. J. (1991). Language and the career of similarity. In S. A.  
Gelman & J. P.Byrnes (Eds).  Perspectives on thought and language: Interrelations in 
development (pp. 225-277). London, Cambridge University Press. 
Goldfield, B. (1993). Noun bias in maternal speech to one-year-olds. Journal of Child Language, 
20,85-100.  
Gopnik, A., Choi, S., Baumberger, T. (1996). Cross-linguistic differences in semantic and  
 cognitive development. Cognitive Development, 11, 197-227. 
Goswami, U. (1992). Analogical reasoning in children. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Halford, G. S. (1993). Children’s understanding: The development of mental models. 
 Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Hansen, C. (1983). Language and logic in ancient China. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press.  
Hedden, T., Park, D.C., Nisbett, R., Lijun, J., Jing, Q., Jian, S. (2002). Cultural variation in 
verbal versus spatial neuropsychological function across the lifespan.  Neuropsychology. 16, 
65-73.  
Hummel, J. E., & Holyoak, K. J. (1997). Distributed representations of structure: A theory of 
analogical access and mapping. Psychological Review, 104, 427-466. 
Ji, L., Peng, K., & Nisbett, R. E. (2000). Culture, control, and perception of relationships in the 
environment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 943-955. 
Analogical Reasoning across Cultures      17 
Krawczyk, D. C., Morrison, R. G., Viskontas, I., Holyoak, K. J., Chow, T. W., Mendez, M., 
Miller, B.L., & Knowlton, B. J. (2008). Distraction during relational reasoning:  The role of 
prefrontal cortex in interference control. Neuropsychologia, 46, 2020-2032. 
Leung (1998).  The Use of Nouns versus Verbs in Cantonese-Speaking Children's Early  
 Vocabularies and Their Mothers' Speech.  Dissertation: University of Hong Kong.   
Morrison, R.G., Doumas, L.A.A., & Richland, L. (2007). Inhibition vs. Relational Knowledge 
constraints in Children’s Analogical Reasoning:  A symbolic-connectionist approach. Poster: 
Meeting of the Cognitive Development Society, Santa Fe, NM. 
Morrison, R.G., Krawczyk, D., Holyoak, K.J., Hummel, J.E., Chow, T., Miller, B., & Knowlton, 
B.J. (2004). A neurocomputational model of analogical reasoning and its breakdown in 
frontotemporal dementia. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 16, 260-271. 
Nisbett, R. E. (2003). The geography of thought: How Asians and Westerners think differently ... 
and why. New York: The Free Press. 
Ogra, T. & Dale, P., Yamashita, Y., Murase, A. (2006). The use of nouns and verbs by  
 Japanese children and their caregivers in book-reading and toy-playing contexts. Journal of 
Child Language, 33, 1-29.  
Richland, L. E., Morrison, R. G., & Holyoak, K. J. (2006). Children’s development of analogical 
reasoning: Insights from scene analogy problems. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 
94, 249-271. 
Richland, L. E., Zur, O., & Holyoak, K. J. (2007). Cognitive supports for analogy in the 
mathematics classroom. Science, 316, 1128-1129. 
Tardif, T., Gelman, S.A., & Xu, F. (1999). Putting the "noun bias" in context: A comparison of 
Mandarin and English. Child Development, 70(3), 620-635. 
Analogical Reasoning across Cultures      18 
Tardif, T., Shatz, M., Naigles, L. (1997). Caregiver speech and children's use of nouns versus 
verbs: A comparison of English, Italian, and Mandarin.   Journal of Child Language, 24(3), 
535-565. 
Analogical Reasoning across Cultures      19 
Author's Note 
The Office of Naval Research Grant N000140810186 partially supported the experiments 
reported herein, as did the National Academy of Education/ Spencer Foundation Postdoctoral 
Fellowship. We thank Dr. Maggie Bruck for her insights on this manuscript.  These data were 
presented at the Society for Research in Child Development and Cognitive Development 
Society, and a portion of these data was submitted in partial fulfillment of the second author's 
Masters thesis at the University of Hong Kong.  
Analogical Reasoning across Cultures      20 
Table 1.  Percentage of correct responses of 3- and 4-year-old Hong Kong and U.S. children in 























































* Standard Deviations in parentheses. 
+Basic chance levels for all problems were 19%.
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Figure Caption Page 
 
Figure 1. Example stimuli showing Reach relation (1-Relation: boy reaching for cookie// dog 
reaching for bone; 2-Relation: mom reaching for boy who is reaching for cookie jar// man 
reaching for dog who is reaching for bone), with results showing cross-cultural differences in the 
effects of relational complexity and distraction on 3- and 4-year-olds' analogical reasoning 
performance. 
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i See Richland et al. (2006) for more detail on instructional controls that ensured children 
understood they were intended to find the analogical match, versus an object match.  
